(The Opening Pages)

These university lectures are devoted to Aesthetics; their subject is the vast realm of the beautiful and, more precisely, their field is art, and especially the fine arts. For this subject, the name Aesthetics is not, strictly speaking, entirely appropriate, since the term “Aesthetics” more precisely denotes the science of sensation and feeling. It originated as a new science, or rather as something that was first intended to become a branch of philosophy, in the school of Wolff, at precisely the time when in Germany works of art were being examined in relation to the feelings they aroused, such as the feeling of pleasure, admiration, fear, sympathy, and so forth.

Because of the inappropriateness, or rather the superficiality, of this name, attempts were made to invent others. But these too proved inadequate, because the science they were intended to designate does not examine the beautiful in general, but only the beautiful in art. We shall therefore retain the name “Aesthetics”, because as a simple name it is of little concern to us and because it has already entered common usage. The authentic expression for our science, however, is “Philosophy of Art” and, more precisely, “Philosophy of Fine Art”.

I. DEFINITION OF AESTHETICS

1. Exclusion of the Beauty of Nature

With this expression we exclude from the outset the beauty of nature. Such a limitation of our subject may appear to be an arbitrary restriction, although every science has the right to define the extent of its subject as it sees fit. We should not, however, accept the restriction of Aesthetics to the beauty of art in this sense. In everyday life we are accustomed to speak of a beautiful colour, a beautiful sky, a beautiful river, and indeed of beautiful flowers, beautiful animals and, above all, beautiful human beings.

Nevertheless, although we do not wish to enter here into the dispute as to whether it is correct to attribute the quality of beauty to such objects and thus place the beauty of nature alongside the beauty of art, we may assert at the outset that the beauty of art is higher than the beauty of nature. For the beauty of art is beauty born and reborn from the spirit, and to the same degree that spirit and its products are superior to nature and its phenomena, the beauty of art is superior to the beauty of nature.

Indeed, even a bad idea that comes into the human mind is, formally considered, superior to any product of nature, because such an idea always contains spirituality and freedom. In terms of content, the sun, for example, appears as an absolutely necessary moment, while a bad idea disappears as something accidental and transient. But in itself, such a natural existence as the sun is indifferent; it is not in itself free and self-conscious. When we examine it in its necessary relation to something else, we do not examine it for itself and therefore do not examine it as beautiful. When we simply say that spirit and the beauty of art which springs from it are superior to the beauty of nature, however, we have established almost nothing, because “superior” is a completely indeterminate expression, which presents the beauty of nature and the beauty of art as coexisting within representation with merely a quantitative and external difference between them.

The superiority of spirit and of the beauty that springs from it over nature is not merely relative. First of all, spirit is the true, which contains everything within itself, so that everything beautiful is truly beautiful insofar as it participates in this higher principle and is produced by it. In this sense, the beauty of nature appears only as a reflection of the beauty that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect and incomplete mode, a mode whose substance is contained within spirit itself. Moreover, the restriction to the fine arts will seem quite natural, because although there is much talk of the beauties of nature, among the ancients less than among ourselves, nevertheless no one has thought of distinguishing the aspect of beauty in natural things and establishing a science, a systematic presentation of these beauties. People distinguished, of course, the aspect of usefulness and established, for example, a science of natural things useful against diseases, a materia medica, a description of minerals, chemical products, plants and animals useful for healing; but no one classified and judged the realm of nature from the standpoint of beauty.

We feel that with the beauty of nature we are dealing with something too indeterminate and without a criterion, and therefore such a classification offers little interest. These preliminary observations on beauty in nature and art, on their relationship, and on the exclusion of the former from the principal subject of our inquiry should refute the view that the limitation of our science is simply arbitrary and accidental. The relationship itself will not be demonstrated at this point, because its examination belongs to our science itself and will therefore be clarified and demonstrated in greater detail later.

2. Refutation of Some Objections to Aesthetics

If we now restrict ourselves to the beautiful in art, we immediately encounter new difficulties. The first question that may occur to us is whether the fine arts are worthy of scientific investigation. For the beautiful and art permeate all the activities of life like a benevolent spirit and pleasantly adorn all external and internal surroundings by moderating the seriousness of relationships and the complexities of reality. They dispel boredom in an entertaining manner and, where there is nothing good to be accomplished, at least take the place of evil, always in a better way than evil itself. Although art, with its pleasing forms, is everywhere present, from the crude ornamentation of savages to the magnificence of richly decorated temples, nevertheless these forms seem to move outside the true ultimate purposes of life. Although works of art do not become harmful to these serious purposes, and sometimes even seem to promote them, at least by restraining evil, art nevertheless belongs more to the reduction and relaxation of the spirit, whereas essential interests require rather its concentration.

For this reason, the impression may arise that what is not serious by its very nature would be inappropriate and pedantic to examine with scientific seriousness. In any case, according to this view, art appears as a luxury, even if the gentleness of feeling that engagement with beauty may produce cannot itself become harmful as mere softness. From this perspective, it has repeatedly proved necessary to defend the fine arts, which are generally regarded as a luxury in relation to practical necessity in general and, more specifically, to morality and religion, and, since their harmlessness cannot be demonstrated, to make it credible that this luxury of the spirit presents, for example, a greater sum of advantages than disadvantages.